The second phase of this project involves coding the content of nearly 100 NLRB cases that involve some contention over the duty to bargain. We are investigating the relative importance of the three major constructs introduced in Dubuque: a basic change in the work; labor costs as a component; and the futility of bargaining in determining the outcome of these cases. The type of industry, occupation, location and other extra-legal factors are being analyzed as well.

The third phase of the project (now in progress) will interview both parties, labor and management, of the cases selected for analysis in phase two. Information will be collected on the eventual consequences of the decision reached by the NLRB on the relocation of work and the viability of the business. The analysis of this information should permit the assessment of the intended consequences of these decisions and the discovery of unintended latent consequences.

Apart from the traditional sociology of law investigation into the effectiveness of law in the wider society, the broader implications of this research concern the type of legal rationality employed by the regulatory state to constrain private actions and the effectiveness of these modes.

I served as the study director for a project run by the American Association for the Advancement of Science to assess the impact of national defense law on the communication of science. More and more of the high technology central to the U.S.'s defense system is being produced in private corporate and university laboratories, settings not directly under the control of the Department of Defense (DoD). Technology that has applications in both private commercial products and military hardware is termed dual-use knowledge and falls outside of the classificatory scheme established by the National Security Act.

In addition to the National Security Act of 1947, four acts enable the restriction of scientific information and technology: The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) (1946, 1954); Export Administration Act (1969, 1979, 1981, 1985); Arms Export Control Act (1976); and the Invention Secrecy Act (1951). In the survey conducted for the AAAS, approximately 2,000 scientists were queried about: their background and professional information; the various methods used to communicate their research results; their typical communication patterns used to disseminate research results; their level of knowledge about the four national security laws and sources of that knowledge; the effects of restrictions on their own scientific communication; the number of instances in which provisions of the laws had been invoked; how the provisions of the regulations were enforced; and about their own attitudes regarding the laws (their effectiveness and consequences for U.S. science). I completed an internal Executive Report transmitted to the AAAS in early 1993, and now have the freedom to analyze and publish these and additional results.

The findings from this research will have implications for the sociology of law and of science. In addition to assessing the primary and intervening variables that determine the law's effectiveness, the information collected can be used to analyze the production of scientific values, primarily freedom of information. This study is unique in that a large number of scientists who work on problems central to the military-industrial complex were interviewed.