

The Political Cultural Field of the 2000 Presidential Vote

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Abstract

This paper examines the connection between people's trust or cynicism in major U.S. institutions and their vote cast for President in the 2000 election. The absence of confidence and trust fuels cynicism, an attitude that may lead elites to exploit institutional resources and the public to withdraw their support from important institutions. We examined the 13 measures of confidence-trust in the 2002 GSS to model the 'cultural field of institutional trust' and learn how trust/cynicism was embedded in the 2000 vote.

We found that trust/cynicism toward all institutions, not just political ones, were implicated in the 2000 vote. Specifically: 1] trust/cynicism in institutions has a component based in a general disposition as well as components oriented toward different types of institutions: political, technocratic, media, (and perhaps human/social welfare). 2] Those not voting in the 2000 election are an amalgam: they had greater, moderate, levels of uniform trust in institutions, not more general cynicism than voters; but they also were more likely to express higher levels of cynicism toward Political and Technocratic institutions. 3] Cynicism focused on political institutions was associated with either not voting or a Nader vote. 4] Cynicism for the Media was strongly associated with Bush vote in 2000, as well as political conservatism and religious fundamentalism. 5] Bush voters in 2000 were more than 3 times as likely as Gore voters to express trust in Technocratic institutions. 6] Gore voters in 2000 expressed cynicism toward federal institutions of government at a rate 3 times higher than Bush voters. 7] Controlling for political orientation (liberal/conservative) and religious fundamentalism only slightly diminished these effects. Thus, the broad field of institutional trust/cynicism is embedded in electoral politics. Existing data won't allow us to disentangle causal direction, but we think institutional trust operates both as a 'cognitive dissonance' mechanism to rationalize past votes as well as a cultural force that induces voting for particular candidates. A reasonable speculation is that these "fields of institutional trust" have been manipulated by political campaign rhetoric.

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This paper examines the connection between people's trust or cynicism in major U.S. institutions and their candidate preferences in the 2000 Presidential election. We believe that public attitudes reflecting levels of institutional trust are important parts of cognitive political culture. Recent political rhetoric has linked cynical orientations toward large institutions with voter mobilization, even though trust and voter preference are distinct conceptually and empirically (Paxton, 1999). Institutional trust refers to perceptions that key institutional sectors are performing effectively in accord with collective rules and producing collective benefits. Declines in institutional trust are generally understood to diminish social capital and further impede effective governing and institutional functioning (Putnam, 2000).

The absence of confidence and trust can fuel cynicism, an attitude that may lead elites to exploit institutional resources or the public to withdraw their support for and involvement with important institutions. If the public becomes increasingly cynical about politicians, and political elites begin to manipulate the mass political culture to reinforce cynicism, as Goldfarb (1991) has argued, democratic political and institutional life is likely to suffer as citizens withdraw from the public sphere and retreat into ever smaller private spheres of life. "Generalist" conceptions of citizenship would slowly decline, being replaced by more "specialist" ideas governing the appropriate role of citizens, creating smaller communities of common fate. Goldfarb's (1991) sweeping notion of a political culture of cynicism implies that this cultural development was well underway at the close of the last century and is already generating predictable consequences for participation and sense of civic duty. A high level of cynicism among political elites undermines reason-based, deliberative democracy. This is one version of how the "civic culture" described by Almond and Verba (1961) and Putnam (2000) may have changed over half a century.

The lack of political trust has been shown to be related to progressive federal policies (Hetherington, 2005). At both the aggregate level, the degree of trust in government appears to correlate with progressive, redistributive federal policies; and at the individual level, trust is associated with support for redistributive spending. Less clear is how trust interacts with political orientations and voting, nor what the causes of trust may be, other than general economic conditions.

We use the admittedly metaphorical concept of an institutional field to orient our thinking about these issues (see e.g. Martin, 2003). Institutions organize social, political, and economic interactions and they also exist as reference points in cognitive representations of social structure. Knowledge about these institutions, and messages traveling around the cultural sea offering interpretations of them, including their 'trustworthiness', contribute to constructing the legitimacy of these institutions. Awarding an institution legitimacy is dependent in part upon a sense of trust in the fundamental objectives and operations of those institutions. Thus, as individuals assess the society and culture in which they live, they develop 'valences', attitudes of trust or cynicism toward those institutions, and these attitudes help direct the level and nature of one's involvement in society. Political culture in our sense is extended to include all of the 'governing' institutions in society, not just those formally part of government that can exercise legal, political power. A decline in the levels of institutional trust can accelerate 'hyper-individualism' which can dramatically limit the possibility of any collective coordinated action, social capital. The level of trust in Government in particular has been shown to affect the level of governmental policies designed to address questions of social justice; only when citizens have high levels of trust in government are governments able to pursue redistributive, social justice oriented policies (Hetherington, 2005).

Empirically, we see more temporal variability in institutional trust than simple generalizations allow (Cappell and Kamens, 2006). The best interpretations support a distinction between the legitimacy awarded the media and other institutions; there has been a consistent increase in mistrust of media institutions centered around conservative and Republican Party orientations (Cappell and Kamens, 2006). Accompanying this media trust trend, the trust levels in other institutions show some slight fluctuations along with 'shocks' to various levels of trust generated by publicized scandals. Paxton (1999: 113ff) examined four areas of institutional trust

using the General Social Survey (GSS) data from 1974-1994 and found little decline in public confidence in religion, education, the executive branch of the federal government or in Congress. There were, however, non-linear fluctuations that corresponded to “scandals” in religion and perceived institutional breakdowns in government. But institutional trust revived after each of these episodes.

One of the most thorough reviews of trust in governmental institutions focuses primarily at the macro-social level, evaluating several broad hypotheses explaining the common decline experienced by most advanced Western societies (Nye, Zeilikow, and King, 1997). Aggregate patterns must reflect the accumulated patterns at the individual level, but can also reflect institutional characteristics at more aggregated units of analysis, thus their review should be understood as a multi-level model, although it is not presented as such. After several less than rigorous empirical inspections, they conclude that, primarily at the macro level, the level of trust in government is a function of “...enlarged, illusory expectations of what government can do (particularly for the World War II generation); the changed role of the media in shaping perceptions; the pervasiveness of more libertarian or postmaterialist values that question authority; and political processes that have created a gap between political elites and the general public.” (Nye, Zeilikow, and King, 1997: p. 268). It is not clear that these forces can be extended to explain trust in a broader field of institutions, but they offer a start.

Media institutions are implicated in the broad legitimacy-seeking projects of institutions. These institutions, the press and TV, have suffered some of the steepest declines in trust over the last half century. Media generated information has been found to be a source of cynicism among the public, primarily because of the cynical messages conveyed, somewhat by the traditional news institutions, but more so by the comic and entertainment outlets, as well as talk radio (Fallows, 1996; Cappella Jamieson, 1997; Baumgartner and Morris, 2006). Figure 1 synthesizes some of the major concepts into a dynamic model of how institutional trust relates to other individual and institutional attributes.

(Insert figure 1 about here)

We do not know, however, what has happened to the full cultural field of institutional trust, including more institutions, and how that ‘field of institutional trust/cynicism’ embeds political action, namely voting. That is the research question pursued in this paper. We note also that we use some alternative methodology not commonly used to decompose these structural components that bring new insights into the dimensions of the “political cultural field”.

The Cultural Field of Trust: Decomposition of 13 Trust Indicators, 2002 GSS.

In this section we analyze indicators measuring trust in 13 major U.S. institutions used in the 2002 General Social Survey. We begin with a more typical factor analysis of the ordinal indicators, and then compare that result to a more unusual, but we think more appropriate, latent class and latent factor (trait) analysis that reveals a somewhat different structure of the associations of trust indicators. We then correlate the trust dimensions with the vote cast in the 2000 election to reveal how the political cultural field embeds the presidential vote cast in that election. We unfortunately are not able to estimate a causal model, since the vote cast in 2000 precedes the measurement of institutional trust obtained in 2002. But that is the argument we would like to make, that various levels of trust in different institutional sectors mobilize political orientations and actions, or inactions. For now, we must settle for association models that cannot specify causal direction.

Respondents were asked 13 questions as part of Question 165, (repeated in all such surveys since 1972), on the level of confidence the respondent had in the leaders of various institutions:

Q165: “I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?”

Banks and Financial Institutions (CONFINAN)

Major companies (CONBUS)

Organized religion (CONCLERG)

Education (CONEDUC)

Executive branch of the federal government (CONFED)
Organized labor (CONLABOR)
Press (CONPRESS)
Medicine (CONMEDIC)
TV (CONTV)
U.S. Supreme Court (CONJUDGE)
Scientific Community (CONSCI)
Congress (CONLEGIS)
Military (CONARMY)

All response formats used 1=a great deal; 2=only some; 3=hardly any; 8,9=missing. Thus, a low score indicates confidence, a high score, lack of confidence, what we will call 'cynicism', an extreme level of mistrust.

These are the best measures available to measure the levels of trust or cynicism regarding American institutions. We take the opposite meaning of confidence to implicitly include an aspect of cynicism. Certainly the concept of cynicism as used by Goldfarb (1991) and others is multi-dimensional, but the aspect of confidence, per se, is easily recognized and analyzed. Institutional Cynicism would seem to have a component of basic mistrust in the motives, the honesty, and the authenticity behind the language and behaviors of institutional leaders; a general lack of confidence. But admittedly, a lack of confidence could stem from assessments of incapacity or incompetence as well as the assessed motives usually associated with a cynical evaluation or orientation.

We factor analyzed the 13 measures to search for a simple structure that could identify the dimensions of Institutional Trust/Cynicism. We explored various estimation methods to examine the robustness of the structure: principal-component-based factor analysis with different assumptions about the communalities of the individual indicators, as well as a maximum likelihood factor analysis using polychoric transformed correlations of the indicators, since the response format to the questions used three ordinal levels. Solutions varied; e.g. the factor analysis based on the polychoric correlations yielded a single factor while the solution based on the Pearson correlations suggested five factors. This led us to adopt the more appropriate latent class approach discussed next. But first it is worth briefly mentioning the factor results. We specified a five factor solution that is justified according the usual criteria of the size of the eigenvalues, proportion of variance explained by the last factor, the communalities of the indicators, and interpretability of the solution (a varimax orthogonal rotation was performed).

(Insert Table 1 about here)

Thus, in the last quarter century, a dimensional field of trust/cynicism emerges that appears to be shaped by some political rhetoric. A dimension that distributes various levels of trust in the agencies of the federal government is apparent; those oriented toward the party in power hypothetically should have greater trust in governmental institutions than those oriented to the challenging party.

The second factor distributes confidence in major corporations and the military – reminiscent of the “military-industrial complex” that emerged after WWII. A slight correlation between trust in organized religion and this military/corporate extends Weber’s cultural affinity between religious forms and capitalism, probably through the new coalition within the Republican Party linking religious fundamentalists, traditional country club Republicans, and the leaders of financial and corporate America (Frank, 2004).

A third, and one that has perhaps not been given enough notice, appears to distribute trust in the medical, scientific, financial institutions, and to a slightly lesser extent, the military and major corporations. All of these institutions involve the use of technical knowledge and technical skills – Technocracy.

A fourth dimension distributes attitudes toward the media (TV and Press) and to a lesser extent Organized Labor. Our earlier work focused on the embeddedness of Media Distrust in the political culture; we argued that the crystallization of media distrust grew as a function of sustained campaign of conservatives to delegitimize the authority of the press and TV (Cappell and Kamens, 2006). In that paper, we show that Media Distrust is more differentiated from the levels of distrust in other institutions than any of the other institutions evaluated.

Variance in trust toward institutions ostensibly oriented toward directly improving the

human condition: organized religion, educational institutions, and to a lesser extent, organized labor and medicine is captured by the fifth and final factor. This dimension reflects trust in the institutions and leaders addressing human and social welfare.

These loadings depicting the inter-correlations of the responses to the trust indicators reflect the general 'field' of institutional trust across the last quarter century as uncovered by traditional factor analysis usually applied to these measures. It is in this context that the time specific structure around 2000-2004 election is examined. We have pointed out elsewhere how distinctive the dimension of trust in the Media is and how Media Cynicism is politically embedded. We might expect that the other dimensions will vary according to the political, economic, and social context of the period as well.

Latent Class Models of Institutional Trust: 1975-2004

A more appropriate modeling technique respects the ordinal level of measurement of the indicators and creates probability based models of an underlying categorical latent variable(s) that highlights the dimensions of the trust institutional field. These latent class models can specify a model with one latent variable and several classes, or several latent categorical variables. After comparing several competing models, we chose a model with 4 latent categorical factors or traits.

(Insert Table 2 about here)

Each of the latent trait variables are dichotomies. The interpretation of each trait is facilitated by estimates of the conditional probability of various levels of trust given one's classification in each level of the latent trait. We can see from Table 2, that given one is identified at the first level of Trait 1, one has a .17 probability of expressing a great deal of trust in Banks & Financial Institutions, a .68 probability of expressing Only some trust, and a .15 probability of expressing Hardly any trust in Financial Institutions. When we compare the conditional probabilities for level 2 of the first trait, we can see that the distribution of trust shifts rather dramatically toward higher levels of trust. This pattern holds across all institutions, more or less, and thus the first latent trait differentiates those who are generally "trusting" of American institutions (level 2) from those who are more cynical or less trusting (level 1). Thus trait 1 merely differentiates the sample into those with different levels of trust, indiscriminantly allocated across all institutions.

The second latent trait can be interpreted in the same fashion. It shows that being coded at level 2 on trait 2 is associated with lower levels of trust, or higher degrees of cynicism, for a handful of institutions, primarily those institutions in the federal government: the executive branch, Supreme Court, Congress, and the military; as well as Financial Institutions and Corporations. This trait apparently differentiates respondents into those with higher and lower levels of trust/cynicism toward the "government-corporate" complex. For example given that one is classified in level 2 on this trait (a cynic), the conditional probability of allocating Hardly any trust to the executive branch of the Federal government is .79.

This alternative methodology confirms that Media Cynicism is a distinct dimension of institutional trust; latent trait 3 primarily differentiates those with Only some trust in both the press and TV from those with hardly any trust, the media cynics.

This fourth latent trait identified differentiates those with higher levels of trust in a wide range of institutions that required technical knowledge to operate: Medicine and the Scientific Community, Military, Financial institutions and Corporations, Supreme Court, and Educational institutions.

This pattern, obtained by a different and more statistically justified methodology, latent class models, confirms in a general way the major dimensions of the field of institutional trust generated by Americans over the last 25 years. We now focus on the recent past, 2000-2002 and learn to what extent the field of institutional trust is associated with the political preferences articulated in the 2000 election.

The Cultural Field of Trust: Decomposition of 13 Trust Indicators, 2002 GSS.

Several models were examined to determine a satisfactory representation for the institutional trust 'field' that made substantive sense and was statistically defensible. Readers should note that there are a few models that produce comparable statistical indications

of an adequate representation of the associations. One chooses a model based on optimal statistical and interpretive properties.

[Insert Table 3 about here]

From these results, it appears that the 3 or 4 Latent Factor models have the best statistical properties, along with the 5 Latent Cluster Model. We briefly discuss the 5 latent class model, then the 4 latent factor/trait model that will be used in the remaining analyses which introduces covariates: political orientation and religious fundamentalism.

Interpretation of the 5 Latent Classes

The latent class model is interpreted as a typology; each class identifies a profile of trust across the institutions and describes individuals with that particular pattern. The categories of the latent variable account for the interactions among the trust indicators. Latent class models assume nominal level measurement of the indicators. The conditional probabilities of responding with various levels of trust given classification in a latent class are given in Table 4.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

Cluster 1: Uniform Trusters: Members are uniformly mild in their trust, the modal category (roughly two-thirds) is “Only Some”, and this distribution of trust is uniform across all institutions targeted. This category of respondents could be said to be unreflective or indiscriminate in their awarding of confidence to various institutions since it is uniform across all institutions evaluated. Some measurement error (unreflective responses) could be captured in this general trust trait. This cluster also represents individuals who have an orientation toward institutions reflecting a moderate level of trust, indicating some healthy democratic skepticism. This profile of trust applies to 38% of the U.S. in 2002.

Cluster 2: High Government Trusters: Respondents classified in this cluster show fairly uniform high levels of trust for all institutions, but especially government institutions. There appear to be no cynics in this cluster, even the least regarded institutions of the Press and TV earn “Some” trust. This profile describes about 18% of the U.S. population.

Cluster 3: Uniform Cynics: Only the institutions of the Military, Scientific Community, and Medicine, escape a cynical orientation. We can speculate that this profile contains the most alienated members of society, those with Hardly Any trust in nearly all institutions. They are parallel to those in Cluster 1 in that they show little discrimination in their level of trusts across institutions. They comprise about 17% of the population.

Cluster 4: Media Cynics: Mistrust of TV and the Press is nearly 100% for those classified in this cluster. However, nearly two-thirds (.62) have a “Great Deal” of trust in the Military, and nearly half (.42) have a “Great Deal” of trust in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. Thus, this profile differentiates the Media Cynics from Military/Executive Branch Trusters. This profile is picking up associations generated by the post 9/11 context. About 16% of the population has this institutional orientation.

Cluster 5: Technocracy Trusters: High level of trust for the Army, Medicine, Science, and to a slightly lesser extent Education & Banks/Financial institutions and even the Supreme Court. This is somewhat akin to the dimension of technocracy uncovered in the factor analysis above. This profile contains those who seem to respect and trust the technical knowledge needed to manage complex and technical information. This profile of institutional trust orientations captures about 11% of the population.

Let’s now turn to an alternative model, a four variable, latent trait model, with 2 levels on each of the latent variables. The latent factor (or trait) model more appropriately treats the indicators as ordinal measures and estimates an ordinal, categorical, latent factor model.

Interpretation of 4 Discrete Latent Factor Results:

In latent class factor models, the latent factors are estimated to be independent of each other and possess at least two categorical levels. Thus, these models help to identify potentially independent dimensions, and with categorical levels, help to cluster or classify the respondents. But the latent variables estimated can also be interpreted as a latent trait reflecting the categorical (ordinal) level of intensity of that trait.

[Insert Table 5 about here]

Trait 1: Degree of Trust

Trait 1 differentiates respondents according to the level of trust/cynicism uniformly allocated across all institutions. Level 1 respondents show only moderate levels of trust toward institutions, whereas Level 2 respondents are more likely (anywhere from twice as likely (e.g. Military) to 8 times as likely (Fed. Exec Branch) to have a “Great Deal” of trust in institutions than are Level 1 respondents, shifting the distributions from a modal category of “Only Some” for Level 1 respondents to a modal category of “Great Deal” for Level 2 respondents on most institutions. But little or no cynicism is reflected in the profile of trust measured on this latent trait. So this trait differentiates respondents along a uniform dimension of how much trust they place in institutions. Note that the same pattern applies to the Press and TV institutions, even though the baseline level of trust is much lower, so that the Level 1 respondents are more cynical about the media. These respondents may be said to be generally unreflective, at least in the sense that very small distinctions are made conditioned on type of institution being evaluated, except for the Media. Level 2 respondents on Trait 1 have uniformly higher levels of trust across institutions than Level 1 respondents. Hence, we label this trait: General (Moderate) Trust. This trait differentiates the population into two levels, those expressing generally moderate to high levels of trust (17%) from those less trusting (83%). This demonstrates that the general modal tendency is for Americans to only cautiously trust nearly all institutions.

Trait 2: Polarized - Political Cynicism

Trait 2 differentiates the level of Trust/Cynicism for primarily federal political institutions. Level 1 reflects a score of “Some Trust” while Level 2 reflects Cynicism. Respondents classified in Level 2 are in general 10 times more likely to have “Hardly Any” trust in the Federal governmental institutions than those in Level 1. The modal response for those classified at Level 1 (trusting) on the indicators of Federal government institutional trust are at the moderate levels of trust, only trust in the Military has a modal category at the highest level of trust. Level 2 respondents are in general more cynical than level 1 respondents, but this difference is accentuated when evaluating Federal governmental institutions. Level 2 respondents, the Federal Government Institution Cynics, could either be the most mobilized politically or the most alienated. In 2002, we would expect these respondents to be disgruntled Gore supporters, reacting to the 2000 election (10 times more likely to be cynical about the Supreme Court) and the subsequent policies of the Bush administration. We note that this cynicism also includes the Media somewhat, especially the Press, but the level of differentiation is not as pronounced as it is for governmental institutions. The model estimates that the adult population contains about 12% who are classifiable as Political Cynics, while 88% show moderate trust in federal institutions.

Trait 3: Technocracy Trust

Levels of trust in Technocratic institutions are differentiated by Trait 3: Level 1 indicates Trust; Level 2 Cynicism. The probabilities of responding that one has “Hardly Any” trust in the Scientific Community, Medicine, Military, Banks & Financial Institutions, the Supreme Court, and the Federal Executive Branch are 8 to 10 times higher for those in Level 1 than for those in Level 2. Correspondingly, Technocracy Trusters are generally twice as likely to report “A Great Deal” of trust for these institutions than are their cynical counterparts. Trait 4 distinguishes those with varying levels of trust and cynicism regarding the Media, and to a lesser extent, Education and Organized Labor. This dimension of cynicism may have its roots in a form of anti-intellectualism. This trait differentiates the levels of Technocracy Trust, and the model estimates that Trusters comprise 45% of the population, those more cynical 55%.

Trait 4: Media Cynicism (& Knowledge Based Institutions)

Those respondents classified in level 2 of this factor are clearly the Media Cynics. In addition to the media, the likelihoods of having “Hardly Any” trust for Organized Labor, Education, and Congress are 2 to 4 times higher Level 2 than Level 1 respondents. Respondents at Level 1 score higher levels of expressing a “Great Deal” of trust in the Press (.15 – still low) than Level 2 respondents (.004 – nonexistent). While knowledge-based institutions are implicated in this latent trait as they were in the Technocracy Trust trait, it is the different distributions on Media trust that more clearly differentiate those along this dimension. The model estimates that 39% of the adult

population has the profile of Media Cynics, 61% more moderately trusting the media.

The Political Aspect of Trust/Cynicism

The next step of the analysis adds the covariate, presidential vote in 2000, to learn how the various dimensions of trust embed the vote cast in the 2000 election. We correlate the latent variable with the 2000 presidential vote to map what we call the political-electoral cultural field of institutional cynicism. Of course, it would be ideal to build a predictive model that explains one's vote as a function of the level of Institutional Trust across the 4 Trust traits, but the time frame of the survey makes this impossible. The best we can do is estimate the embeddedness, or association, of how Trust traits are linked to past political preferences.

The latent class factor models dichotomize the latent variable into a level 1 (0) and a level 2 (1). When the probability averages are computed within each category of the Presidential Vote in 2000 (the covariate), one obtains the likelihood of being at level 2 of the factor for those who voted for each candidate. These estimates give us the Political Cultural Field of Trust/Cynicism measured in 2002 that embeds the vote cast in the 2000 election. This association establishes the politicalization of trust/cynicism, the main focus of our research question.

(Insert Table 6 about here)

The results of this analysis useful for interpretation are presented in Table 6. The association between vote cast in the 2000 presidential election and levels of trust on all Latent Trust Traits are statistically significant at the .05 level. When interpreting these results, it is important to keep in mind that the vote for President was cast 2 years before the measurements of Trust/Cynicism in these major institutions.

The first row in Table 6 gives the probabilities of being at level 2 of each of the four Latent Trust Traits. For example, across all respondents, a relatively small proportion, .1664, scored at Level 2, High trust. The remaining figures are the conditional probabilities for being at the second level of each trait given how one voted in 2000.

How are the 2002 General Trust Traits embedded in 2000 voting preferences? The results of this analysis suggest a slightly more complex picture than commonly portrayed. There is really not much substantial difference in level of General Trust between Bush and Gore voters, although Bush voters do show a slightly higher tendency than Gore voters. The much more striking difference is found among those who did not vote, the less politically engaged, where there is a higher level of General Trust, .21, than among the total population. We can not reliably say much about the third party voters for Nader or Buchanan because the frequencies of those voters are too small. The findings suggest that the voters for Buchanan are now the most cynical about American institutions. Speculating on these findings, higher levels of trust, not cynicism, seem to be associated with political indifference. Commitment to some third party candidates (Buchanan not Nader) is associated with higher levels of Cynicism.

Let's turn our attention to the embeddedness of 2000 voting and the level of Federal Government Cynicism (Trait 2). Those who voted for Gore in 2000 are 3 times more likely to be cynical about Federal governmental institutions in 2002 than are those who voted for Bush (.12/.04). We cautiously note (because of small frequencies) that 2000 Nader voters expressed the highest levels of Cynicism for Federal governmental institutions, .3569.

The association between the 2000 vote and the distribution on the Technocracy Trust trait provides some of the more interesting results. While those who did not vote in 2000 generally showed higher levels of trust in all institutions in 2002; the reverse is true for the level of trust in Technocracy. Overall, about 45% of the adult population in 2002 was estimated to have higher levels of trust in Technocracy. Among those who did not vote in the 2000 election, about 30% have higher levels of Technocracy Trust. This is roughly the same level as those who voted for Gore (28%). But among those who voted for Bush, 72% trust the Technocratic institutions at a higher level. We also note, with reservation, that Nader voters also have a higher than average trust in Technocracy. We also note that the 'War on Science' that has been used to characterize the Bush administration's policies on global warming, stem cell research, and other areas, is not reflected in public attitudes, at least as of 2002 (Specter, 2006). Bush voters in 2000 trust Science, Medicine, the technology based Military more than the average adult. A vote for Bush in

2000 correlates with expressed higher trust in Technocracy in 2002. This aspect of the embeddedness of political voting and trust may hark back to the Progressive and New Deal era when an unchecked private corporate sector harnessed new technology and developed in an unregulated economic environment. Some voters (Gore) and non-voters place less trust in those institutions built on complex and technical knowledge than others (Bush voters).

The distribution of Media Cynicism (our 4th trait) offers few surprises. While the model estimates that among the adult population, 39% are Media Cynics in 2002, 63% of the Bush voters are. This probably just reflects in part the defensive reaction to the reporting of bad news by those supporting the party and administration in power. We have documented elsewhere, however, that Media Cynicism more consistently embedded in conservative and especially Republican political orientations (Cappell & Kamens, 2006).

These results show that it is correct to say that in 2002, those that voted for Bush have a higher trust in major U.S. institutions, except the Media. By contrast, those who voted for Gore have generally lower levels of trust in these institutions, except the Media. These findings are not consistent with the political mobilization theses emphasizing general alienation. Those who did not vote have slightly higher levels of General Institutional Trust across the board. Political cultural inconsistencies are also evident: for instance the trust in educational institutions for example. The Bush administration has attacked the quality of education produced by public schools and has challenged the institutional autonomy of universities. Yet among the American public, circa 2002, as measured by this general trust factor, those who voted for Bush have higher levels of trust than is found among those who voted for Gore; they have higher levels of trust in Technocracy, in which Education serves as a moderate indicator. We suggest these findings point out the differences between the ideological battle and mobilizing rhetoric that takes place among the elite and how that message does, or does not, filter into the consciousness of average Americans.

The findings also point out the continuing paradox of conservative Republican rhetoric that attacks government as the problem and the general trust of Bush supporters in a wide array of major U.S. institutions. Writ large, this is more evidence of how incoherent and irrational the political discourse and political behavior has become. Taken together, these findings point out the internal contradictions regarding the political cultural field of voting mobilization. While in general, those who voted for Bush have a nearly undifferentiated and higher level of trust than expected, they also reflect higher levels of cynicism toward the media and knowledge producing institutions. One Trust trait, political institutional cynicism, is associated with those who preferred third party candidate Nader, and to a lesser extent, those not voting in 2000.

While this cross-sectional analysis can not estimate the effects of the dynamic interplay between trust, cynicism, and political mobilization, we can hypothesize that the backers of successful candidates adjust their levels of trust and cynicism to reflect the cognitive balance between the leader they helped to choose and the institutions of our society. Backers of unsuccessful candidates are likely to lower their levels of trust and raise their levels of cynicism. The dilemma is, of course, when a threshold is crossed and the respondent becomes uniformly cynical ceases political involvement. The analysis has shown that the profile of trust across all institutions is embedded in the political culture reflected in candidate choice.

In the next set of results, we introduce two covariates, political orientation and level of religious fundamentalism to check the validity of the basic link between institutional trust and political preference. The relatively small size of the sample restricts the complexity of the models we are able to estimate, so we introduce the two covariates separately.

In Table 7, we can see what happens to the embeddedness of Trust traits and political preference when a second covariate, political orientation, is introduced. Because the sample is adjusted to exclude cases with missing political orientation measures, the measurement model is slightly affected, primarily in the latent trait 2 which now accentuates the trust in the Military as the more pronounced indicator than the other Federal Government institutions. Once the level of liberal/conservative political orientation is adjusted for, the differences in the General Cynicism/Trust trait show that those who voted for the mainstream candidates, Bush & Gore, are in general less cynical than those who did not vote or voted for third party candidates. Independent of the effects of level of conservatism, Bush voters in 2000 show 10 times the trust in the Military & Federal government institutions than do Gore voters (.50/.05). With respect to the

Technocracy Trust Trait, we see the consistent pattern that Bush voters trust the technocracy more than Gore voters, although the differences in the profiles is smaller when adjusted for levels of political conservatism. But we note that the levels of political conservatism/liberalism do not differentiate the levels of trust in Technocracy. Since the candidate preferred 2 years earlier does differentiate trust profiles, we suspect that respondents are reacting to the more circumscribed means and goals of institutions during the current time frame, and not a more generic Technocracy Trust level embedded in conservatism/liberalism. The association between one's 2000 vote and Media Cynicism remains robust after controlling for political orientation.

[Insert Table 7 about here]

After controlling for one's vote in the 2000 election, general political orientation appears to be associated with only two of the four Institutional Trust traits, the Military (and to a lesser extent the Federal branch, and Media Cynicism. With respect to general and undifferentiated Institutional Cynicism, Trait 1, liberals are slightly more cynical, but not by much. There is practically no difference in the level of Technocracy Trust across the liberal/conservative spectrum. The results are consistent with a time bound, localized, manifestation of how Institutional Trust is embedded in political orientations and candidate preference. As the U.S. militarized and empowered the Federal Government in 2002, Bush supporters and conservatives retained (or perhaps increased) their trust while liberals, and Gore supporters became more Cynical. They also reacted in expected manners to the institutions able to report and evaluate the news and results of those actions.

As another effort to check the robustness of the association between candidate preference and Institutional Trust profiles, we introduced the level of religious fundamentalism as a covariate. These results are presented in Table 8. Earlier findings regarding the association of General Trust and candidate preference are substantiated: those not voting, the politically disengaged, have a higher level of general trust than those voting. The level of fundamentalism is not associated with different profiles of General Trust, perhaps a surprising finding given some arguments that religious fundamentalism is associated with a more authoritarian attitude than religious liberalism. Once one controls for level of religious fundamentalism, Gore voters are 2 times, not 4 times, more cynical about Federal Government institutions. Levels of religious fundamentalism heighten the differences in the Technocracy Trust profiles across candidate preferences. Once we control for fundamentalism, Bush voters are 10 times more likely to express higher levels of trust in Technocracy than Gore voters were. Religious liberals have less trust in Technocracy than religious fundamentalists, likely due to different orientations toward the Military, one component of the Technocracy. And lastly, the profiles of Media Cynicism across candidate vote are substantiated: Bush voters are twice as likely to be classified as Media Cynics than are Gore voters. Religious fundamentalist are more cynical as well (.3838), controlling for candidate preference.

[Insert Table 8 about here]

The introduction of controls did not alter the fundamental patterns of how Institutional Trust is embedded politically with candidate preference. The two controls, political orientation and religious fundamentalism, are associated with trust in a weak way, not nearly as strongly as candidate preference, and in ways that are expected based on our previous understanding. The one exception, perhaps, is the association between General Trust and religious fundamentalism which shows no pattern of association once the preferred candidate is included in the model. The general high levels of skepticism toward all institutions are spread fairly indiscriminately across all levels of religious fundamentalism, political orientation, and candidate preference. But those who did not vote in 2000 seem to have a higher level of General Trust than the adult population writ large.

Conclusion

This analysis of the political cultural field shows that the dimensions of Institutional Trust/Cynicism in 2002 are embedded in the Presidential candidate preference in the 2000 election. All of the institutions surveyed are embedded, not just political institutions. Overall, the profiles of institutional trust can be decomposed into four dimensions, general, federal governmental, technocracy, and media.

Contrary to our common understanding, some of those who did not vote in the 2000

election express more than average General Trust toward all institutions, rather than less. It is as if these citizens defer their political involvement to the trusted, albeit only moderately trusted, actions of all the institutions in the cultural field. However, our analysis shows nonvoters to be an amalgam: some have an indiscriminant moderate level of trust in all institutions; others are cynical but primarily about Political and Technocratic institutions.

A second independent dimension revealed an Institutional Trust trait focused on Federal government institutions. Here as expected, Gore voters in 2000 expressed higher levels of cynicism in 2002 than Bush voters. Political cynicism seems to accompany alienated, inactive voters and perhaps those with preferences for third party candidates (Nader). Nader voters in 2000 had the most cynical profile about government in 2002.

The third trait of institutional trust identified, Technocracy Trust, showed that Bush voters expressed a higher level of trust in the Technocratic Institutions, followed by Nader voters. Gore voters and nonvoters had the most cynical profiles toward the Technocracy. Interestingly, in the model containing both candidate vote and political orientation, conservatives and liberals have about the same profiles of Technocracy Trust.

The profiles of Media Cynicism are profound and robust: Media Cynicism is associated with being a Bush voter, a political conservative, and a religious fundamentalist.

In 2002, citizens who voted for Bush compared to Gore in 2000 were embedded in a cultural field that on one dimension reflected average levels of trust in nearly all institutions mentioned, but this was primarily due to Gore voters with a more slightly more cynical general profile. The general Trust dimension reflects those who are the moderately “sunnyside, always on the sunnyside” respondents: American institutions are doing OK, not great. Gore voters were slightly less likely than Bush voters to have this profile.

But by dramatic margins, Bush voters compared to Gore voters reflected higher levels of trust in the Federal governmental institutions, Technocracy, and higher levels of Media Cynicism.

Political conservatives show a tendency, but one that is not statistically significant, for higher levels of General Institutional Trust. In 2002, conservatives had a profile more trusting of Federal government institutions than liberals, by a wide margin. Once controlling for the candidate voted for in 2000, there was not much difference in the profile of trust in Technocracy between conservatives and liberals. Conservatives had a more cynical profile toward the Media than liberals.

Religious orientation, fundamentalist/liberal, does not appear to be strongly associated with institutional trust profiles once candidate preference is taken into account. Fundamentalists are more cynical about the media, but have a profile reflecting slightly higher trust in Technocracy than average. There is basically no relation between fundamentalist orientation and trust in general, or toward Federal governmental institutions, once candidate preference is included.

The political cultural field surrounding candidate preferences and political orientations includes traits, tendencies, to accord major American Institutions more or less trust. More than political institutions are involved. We were able to glimpse only the shadows cast by the complex roles Institutional Trust plays in our political culture, limited as we were by the research designs used in existing national surveys. Our findings demonstrate that levels of Institutional Trust, important attitudes that establish the basic legitimacy of a wide range of institutions, quite likely affect, and are affected by, voting behavior and the actions of those elected. The political cultural field is complex and at some levels contradictory and incoherent from a rational perspective. One direction future analyses can take would extend these models to other years, to track the fluid dimensions of the political culture over time and to see how the embedded vote fits into this changing political culture from year to year.

Table 1: Rotated Factor Loadings of Trust Indicators (GSS 1975-2004 file)

Trust Indicator Confidence In:	Factor					Community
	1 Fed Gov.	2 Milt/Corp	3 Technocracy	4 Media	5 Human Welfare	
EXEC BRANCH OF FED GOVT	.73	.24	.12	-.02	.12	.613
CONGRESS	.71	.20	.14	.18	.09	.609
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT	.56	.10	.50	.09	.02	.577
MILITARY	.31	.71	-.01	.02	.04	.598
PRESS	.16	-.04	.19	.76	.07	.649
TELEVISION	.05	.26	.01	.77	.05	.669
ORGANIZED LABOR	.47	-.06	-.18	.33	.35	.491
MEDICINE	-.03	.25	.53	.26	.29	.498
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY	.18	.03	.81	.05	.01	.698
BANKS & FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS	.09	.69	.13	.22	.14	.569
MAJOR COMPANIES	.09	.49	.40	-.02	.20	.447
ORGANIZED RELIGION	.02	.22	.07	-.05	.80	.695
EDUCATION	.27	.04	.13	.19	.62	.516

Note: Listwise deletion was used to remove missing cases. Trust in financial institutions questions was first asked in 1975.

Table 2: Conditional Probabilities of Cynicism/Trust Response given 4 Latent Factors.
(GSS 1975-2004, n=24,354)

	Trait 1		Trait 2		Trait 3		Trait 4	
	General Moderate Trust		Fed. Gov./Corp. Cynicism		Media Cynicism		Technocracy Trust	
	Level 1	Level 2	Level 1	Level 2	Level 1	Level 2	Level 1	Level 2
	cynical	trusting	trusting	cynical	trusting	cynical	cynical	trusting
Banks & Financial (CONFINAN)								
A great deal	0.1737	0.5805	0.2655	0.0888	0.2555	0.1416	0.1167	0.4479
Only some	0.6803	0.4041	0.6479	0.6503	0.6530	0.6796	0.6715	0.5191
Hardly any	0.1461	0.0154	0.0867	0.2609	0.0915	0.1788	0.2119	0.0330
Major Corp (CONBUS)								
A great deal	0.1802	0.4561	0.2704	0.0665	0.2202	0.1888	0.1120	0.4431
Only some	0.7160	0.5221	0.6692	0.6799	0.6989	0.7130	0.7194	0.5335
Hardly any	0.1038	0.0218	0.0604	0.2536	0.0809	0.0982	0.1685	0.0234
Organized Labor (CONLABOR)								
A great deal	0.0680	0.3213	0.1044	0.0454	0.1228	0.0365	0.0778	0.1076
Only some	0.5648	0.5931	0.6135	0.5086	0.6268	0.4765	0.5818	0.6163
Hardly any	0.3672	0.0857	0.2821	0.4460	0.2504	0.4870	0.3403	0.2761
Organized Religion (CONCLERG)								
A great deal	0.2307	0.4641	0.2949	0.1488	0.2841	0.2053	0.1778	0.4145
Only some	0.5631	0.4658	0.5508	0.5482	0.5539	0.5631	0.5588	0.4963
Hardly any	0.2061	0.0701	0.1543	0.3030	0.1620	0.2317	0.2634	0.0891
Fed. Executive Branch (CONFED)								
A great deal	0.0559	0.6027	0.1764	0.0026	0.1006	0.0691	0.0695	0.1320
Only some	0.6202	0.3857	0.6948	0.2083	0.6819	0.6465	0.6471	0.6955
Hardly any	0.3239	0.0116	0.1287	0.7891	0.2175	0.2844	0.2834	0.1725
Supreme Court (CONJUDGE)								
A great deal	0.2175	0.8128	0.4024	0.0539	0.3332	0.2133	0.2073	0.4578
Only some	0.6662	0.1848	0.5541	0.5846	0.6044	0.6677	0.6695	0.5098
Hardly any	0.1162	0.0024	0.0435	0.3615	0.0624	0.1191	0.1231	0.0323
Congress (CONLEGIS)								
A great deal	0.0217	0.6927	0.0896	0.0013	0.0678	0.0141	0.0371	0.0580
Only some	0.6902	0.3056	0.8135	0.2723	0.8064	0.6240	0.7592	0.7980
Hardly any	0.2881	0.0018	0.0969	0.7263	0.1258	0.3618	0.2036	0.1440
Military (CONARMY)								
A great deal	0.2825	0.8138	0.4206	0.1718	0.3664	0.3468	0.2549	0.5419
Only some	0.5963	0.1823	0.5180	0.6157	0.5531	0.5646	0.6062	0.4259
Hardly any	0.1212	0.0039	0.0614	0.2125	0.0804	0.0886	0.1389	0.0322
Scientific Community (CONSCI)								
A great deal	0.3795	0.7032	0.4879	0.2201	0.4469	0.3774	0.2873	0.6495
Only some	0.5669	0.2893	0.4820	0.6561	0.5154	0.5684	0.6263	0.3392
Hardly any	0.0536	0.0075	0.0301	0.1238	0.0376	0.0542	0.0864	0.0112
Medicine (CONMEDIC)								
A great deal	0.4284	0.7776	0.5308	0.3103	0.5431	0.3416	0.2817	0.7713
Only some	0.5245	0.2179	0.4422	0.6036	0.4317	0.5849	0.6186	0.2240
Hardly any	0.0471	0.0045	0.0270	0.0861	0.0252	0.0735	0.0997	0.0048
Education (CONEDUC)								
A great deal	0.2151	0.6414	0.3123	0.1284	0.3300	0.1424	0.1825	0.4251
Only some	0.6605	0.3471	0.6137	0.6621	0.6025	0.6663	0.6677	0.5338
Hardly any	0.1244	0.0115	0.0740	0.2095	0.0675	0.1912	0.1498	0.0411
Press (CONPRESS)								
A great deal	0.0783	0.3019	0.1136	0.0534	0.2162	0.0069	0.0700	0.1570
Only some	0.6489	0.6312	0.6800	0.6022	0.6765	0.3055	0.6366	0.6895
Hardly any	0.2728	0.0669	0.2063	0.3445	0.1073	0.6876	0.2934	0.1535
TV (CONTV)								
A great deal	0.0596	0.2561	0.0829	0.0535	0.1563	0.0079	0.0480	0.1424
Only some	0.6013	0.6513	0.6404	0.5868	0.6788	0.3102	0.5715	0.6774
Hardly any	0.3390	0.0926	0.2767	0.3596	0.1649	0.6819	0.3805	0.1802
Overall Trait Size	0.8605	0.1395	0.7886	0.2114	0.7050	0.2950	0.6095	0.3905

Table 3: Results from Latent Class & Trait Analysis of 13 Institutional Trust Indicators
(GSS 2002, n=798)

Model	Model Type	Parameters Estimated	LR ²	LR BIC
1	2 Class Cluster / 1 Factor	40	7891.08	-10645274
2	3 Class Cluster	54	7623.40	-10645419
3	2 Latent Factor	54	7564.27	-10645508
4	4 Class Cluster	68	7494.10	-10645484
5	3 Latent Factor	68	7414.68	-10645564
6	5 Class Cluster	82	7423.36	-10645461
7	4 Latent Factor	82	7319.59	-10645565
8	6 Class Cluster	96	7365.37	-10645426
9	7 Class Cluster	110	7323.19	-10645375
10	8 Class Cluster	124	7271.14	-10645333

Table 4: Conditional Probabilities of Trust Level given Latent Cluster Membership
(GSS 2002, n=798)

	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Cluster 5
	Gen. & Mod. Level Trusters	Higher Level Trusters	Gen. Cynics	Media Cynics	Tech. Trusters
Banks & Financial (CONFINAN)					
A great deal	0.1390	0.4305	0.0162	0.2083	0.5113
Only some	0.7017	0.5391	0.4415	0.6891	0.4693
Hardly any	0.1594	0.0304	0.5423	0.1026	0.0194
Major Corp (CONBUS)					
A great deal	0.1150	0.4498	0.0243	0.1529	0.2717
Only some	0.7272	0.5288	0.5491	0.7281	0.6714
Hardly any	0.1578	0.0213	0.4266	0.1190	0.0569
Organized Labor (CONLABOR)					
A great deal	0.1183	0.2632	0.0340	0.0394	0.1313
Only some	0.6862	0.6564	0.5420	0.5639	0.6904
Hardly any	0.1955	0.0804	0.4239	0.3967	0.1783
Organized Religion (CONCLERG)					
A great deal	0.1389	0.3681	0.0786	0.2052	0.2438
Only some	0.5888	0.5442	0.5306	0.6021	0.5968
Hardly any	0.2723	0.0877	0.3908	0.1927	0.1594
Fed. Executive Branch (CONFED)					
A great deal	0.1131	0.8409	0.0041	0.4156	0.1275
Only some	0.7120	0.1579	0.2754	0.5554	0.7157
Hardly any	0.1749	0.0012	0.7205	0.0290	0.1568
Supreme Court (CONJUDGE)					
A great deal	0.2387	0.8925	0.0478	0.3463	0.4486
Only some	0.6581	0.1068	0.5681	0.5955	0.5175
Hardly any	0.1032	0.0007	0.3841	0.0582	0.0340
Congress (CONLEGIS)					
A great deal	0.0349	0.6271	0.0019	0.0175	0.0735
Only some	0.7694	0.3704	0.3303	0.6785	0.8207
Hardly any	0.1958	0.0025	0.6678	0.3040	0.1058
Military (CONARMY)					
A great deal	0.4595	0.9246	0.1877	0.6246	0.6634
Only some	0.4872	0.0748	0.6086	0.3546	0.3206
Hardly any	0.0533	0.0006	0.2036	0.0208	0.0160
Scientific Community (CONSCI)					
A great deal	0.3074	0.6935	0.1052	0.3148	0.7530
Only some	0.6129	0.2982	0.6405	0.6085	0.2419
Hardly any	0.0797	0.0084	0.2544	0.0767	0.0051
Medicine (CONMEDIC)					
A great deal	0.2051	0.6541	0.1061	0.3148	0.9274
Only some	0.6581	0.3348	0.6422	0.6089	0.0722
Hardly any	0.1368	0.0111	0.2517	0.0763	0.0004
Education (CONEDUC)					
A great deal	0.1835	0.5418	0.0618	0.1392	0.4889
Only some	0.6669	0.4365	0.5901	0.6648	0.4818
Hardly any	0.1497	0.0217	0.3481	0.1960	0.0293
Press (CONPRESS)					
A great deal	0.1368	0.1827	0.0084	0.0000	0.1666
Only some	0.6222	0.6315	0.2679	0.0139	0.6303
Hardly any	0.2410	0.1858	0.7237	0.9860	0.2031
TV (CONTV)					
A great deal	0.1003	0.1582	0.0183	0.0018	0.1898
Only some	0.5778	0.6124	0.3465	0.1258	0.6165
Hardly any	0.3219	0.2294	0.6353	0.8724	0.1937
Overall Trait Size	0.3830	0.1784	0.1698	0.1557	0.1131

Table 5: Results from 4 Latent Factor Categorical Model (2 levels each factor). Conditional Probabilities of Cynicism/Trust Response given Latent Factor Classifications. (GSS 2002, n=762)

	Trait 1		Trait 2		Trait 3		Trait 4	
	General	Moderate	Fed. Gov.	Cynicism	Technocracy	Trust	Media	Cynicism
	Trust	Trust	Trust	Cynical	Cynical	Trust	Trust	Cynical
	Level 1	Level 2	Level 1	Level 2	Level 1	Level 2	Level 1	Level 2
	cynical	trusting	trusting	cynical	cynical	trusting	trusting	cynical
Banks & Financial (CONFINAN)								
A great deal	0.1402	0.3745	0.1927	0.0541	0.0750	0.3682	0.2577	0.0781
Only some	0.7102	0.5872	0.7012	0.6356	0.6735	0.5922	0.6699	0.6775
Hardly any	0.1496	0.0383	0.1061	0.3103	0.2515	0.0396	0.0724	0.2444
Major Corp (CONBUS)								
A great deal	0.1036	0.4302	0.1539	0.0564	0.0745	0.2642	0.1948	0.0764
Only some	0.7348	0.5481	0.7367	0.6853	0.7136	0.6813	0.7222	0.7156
Hardly any	0.1616	0.0217	0.1093	0.2583	0.2119	0.0545	0.0830	0.2080
Organized Labor (CONLABOR)								
A great deal	0.0657	0.3030	0.0899	0.0824	0.0905	0.0871	0.1490	0.0348
Only some	0.6678	0.6434	0.6975	0.6904	0.6980	0.6951	0.7159	0.5826
Hardly any	0.2665	0.0537	0.2126	0.2272	0.2115	0.2178	0.1351	0.3826
Organized Religion (CONCLERG)								
A great deal	0.1437	0.4117	0.1828	0.1430	0.1258	0.2590	0.2104	0.1341
Only some	0.6052	0.5229	0.6140	0.6049	0.5960	0.6028	0.6134	0.6007
Hardly any	0.2511	0.0654	0.2032	0.2521	0.2782	0.1382	0.1762	0.2652
Fed. Executive Branch (CONFED)								
A great deal	0.1035	0.8281	0.2617	0.0032	0.0784	0.4114	0.1792	0.1975
Only some	0.6937	0.1704	0.6646	0.2347	0.6710	0.5559	0.7011	0.6956
Hardly any	0.2028	0.0015	0.0736	0.7621	0.2506	0.0328	0.1196	0.1069
Supreme Court (CONJUDGE)								
A great deal	0.2143	0.9255	0.4121	0.0514	0.2257	0.5253	0.4163	0.2537
Only some	0.6817	0.0742	0.5524	0.6061	0.6770	0.4557	0.5490	0.6632
Hardly any	0.1039	0.0003	0.0355	0.3425	0.0973	0.0189	0.0347	0.0831
Congress (CONLEGIS)								
A great deal	0.0113	0.6084	0.0656	0.0000	0.0186	0.0462	0.0485	0.0112
Only some	0.6707	0.3896	0.8473	0.0119	0.7445	0.8340	0.8367	0.6704
Hardly any	0.3181	0.0020	0.0871	0.9881	0.2368	0.1198	0.1148	0.3183
Military (CONARMY)								
A great deal	0.4729	0.9276	0.6308	0.2399	0.4055	0.7729	0.6206	0.5310
Only some	0.4870	0.0720	0.3534	0.6283	0.5374	0.2220	0.3624	0.4398
Hardly any	0.0401	0.0004	0.0158	0.1317	0.0570	0.0051	0.0169	0.0292
Scientific Community (CONSCI)								
A great deal	0.3208	0.6816	0.4174	0.1469	0.2386	0.5751	0.4786	0.2420
Only some	0.6087	0.3098	0.5400	0.6678	0.6525	0.4073	0.4907	0.6511
Hardly any	0.0705	0.0086	0.0426	0.1852	0.1089	0.0176	0.0307	0.1069
Medicine (CONMEDIC)								
A great deal	0.3208	0.6816	0.4174	0.1469	0.2386	0.5751	0.4786	0.2420
Only some	0.6087	0.3098	0.5400	0.6678	0.6525	0.4073	0.4907	0.6511
Hardly any	0.0705	0.0086	0.0426	0.1852	0.1089	0.0176	0.0307	0.1069
Education (CONEDUC)								
A great deal	0.1499	0.6081	0.2050	0.2147	0.1255	0.3419	0.3181	0.0887
Only some	0.6921	0.3801	0.6826	0.6791	0.6880	0.6051	0.6218	0.6649
Hardly any	0.1580	0.0117	0.1124	0.1062	0.1865	0.0530	0.0601	0.2465
Press (CONPRESS)								
A great deal	0.0366	0.1176	0.0601	0.0034	0.0427	0.0486	0.1534	0.0037
Only some	0.4980	0.6419	0.5695	0.1986	0.5210	0.5399	0.6547	0.2057
Hardly any	0.4655	0.2405	0.3703	0.7980	0.4362	0.4114	0.1918	0.7906
TV (CONTV)								
A great deal	0.0395	0.1373	0.0537	0.0264	0.0423	0.0604	0.1404	0.0064
Only some	0.4847	0.6310	0.5294	0.4258	0.4949	0.5456	0.6321	0.2441
Hardly any	0.4758	0.2317	0.4168	0.5478	0.4628	0.3941	0.2275	0.7496
Overall Trait Size								
	0.8336	0.1664	0.8843	0.1157	0.5535	0.4465	0.6084	0.3916

Note: The model was estimated with the covariate, presidential vote in 2000, restricted to have no effect on the estimation of the latent traits, i.e. the measurement model.

Table 6: Probability of Level 2 on Each Trait given Presidential Voting Behavior in 2000
(GSS 2002, n=762)

	Trait 1	Trait 2	Trait 3	Trait 4
	General Moderate L2=Trust	Fed. Gov. L2=Cynicism	Technocracy L2=Trust	Media L2=Cynicism
Overall probability of being at level 2:	0.1664	0.1157	0.4465	0.3916
Probability of being at level 2 conditioned on voting preference:				
DID NOT VOTE	.2102	.1707	.3022	.3254
GORE	.1297	.1207	.2796	.2003
BUSH	.1628	.0433	.7238	.6300
NADER	.1625	.3569	.5611	.3577
BUCHANAN/OTHER	.0016	.0051	.4417	.9887

Note: Voting Preference was created by computing a new variable, combining VOTE00 and PRES00. The DID NOT VOTE category contains eligible voters who did not vote; ineligible voters were dropped from the analysis.

Table 7: Probability of Level 2 on Each Trait given Presidential Voting Behavior in 2000 & Political Orientation (GSS 2002, n=753)

	Trait 1	Trait 2	Trait 3	Trait 4
	General Moderate L2=Cynicism	Fed. Army L2=Trust	Technocracy L2=Trust	Media L2=Cynicism
Overall probability of being at level 2:	.3140	.2080	.3680	.4536
Probability of being at level 2 conditioned on voting preference:				
DID NOT VOTE	.3534	.0317	.3831	.4813
GORE	.2985	.0522	.3018	.3094
BUSH	.2722	.4960	.4186	.5817
NADER	.5852	.2492	.3870	.2946
BUCHANAN/OTHER	.5028	.9976	.0002	.0049
Probability of being at level 2 conditioned on level of political conservatism:				
EXTREM. LIBERAL	.4504	.0033	.2697	.2796
LIBERAL	.3608	.0058	.4177	.2822
SLIGHT LIBERAL	.3452	.0268	.3456	.2946
MODERATE	.3187	.1046	.3898	.4406
SLIGHT CONSERV.	.2586	.3661	.3504	.5709
CONSERVATIVE	.2886	.5495	.3389	.6091
EXTREM. CONSERV.	.2379	.5535	.3415	.6044

Note: Voting Preference was created by computing a new variable, combining VOTE00 and PRES00. The DID NOT VOTE category contains eligible voters who did not vote; ineligible voters were dropped from the analysis.

Table 8: Probability of Level 2 on Each Trait given Presidential Voting Behavior in 2000 & Degree of Religious Fundamentalism (GSS 2002, n=762)

	Trait 1	Trait 2	Trait 3	Trait 4
	General Moderate L2=Trust	Fed. Gov. L2=Cynicism	Technocracy L2=Trust	Media L2=Cynicism
Overall probability of being at level 2:	0.2675	0.2141	0.3125	0.4160
Probability of being at level 2 conditioned on voting preference:				
DID NOT VOTE	.3125	.3250	.2005	.3609
GORE	.2402	.2070	.0946	.3061
BUSH	.2547	.1035	.6021	.5731
NADER	.2869	.5545	.4757	.2544
BUCHANAN/OTHER	.0035	.0116	.3785	.9911
Probability of being at level 2 conditioned on level of religious fundamentalism:				
FUNDAMENTALIST	.2859	.2279	.3309	.5357
MODERATE	.2574	.1957	.3532	.3481
LIBERAL	.2613	.2236	.2386	.3838

Note: Voting Preference was created by computing a new variable, combining VOTE00 and PRES00. The DID NOT VOTE category contains eligible voters who did not vote; ineligible voters were dropped from the analysis.




Figure 1: Dynamic Relationships among Institutional Trust, Institutional Performance, and Political Engagement.